Aerial warfare

History of warfare
Eras
Prehistoric warfare
Ancient warfare
Medieval warfare
Early modern warfare
Modern warfare
Types
Naval warfare
Siege warfare
Trench warfare
Guerrilla warfare
Aerial warfare
Armoured warfare
Maneuver warfare
Attrition warfare
Mountain warfare
Urban warfare
Nuclear warfare
Space warfare
Lists
List of wars
List of battles
List of sieges
edit

Aerial warfare is the use of aircraft and other flying machines for the purposes of warfare. Having developed from using unpowered observation balloons in the 18th century, aerial warfare has become a high-technology affair that has led to many advances in propulsion, radar, carbon fibers, and more.

Contents

Balloon warfare

Some minor use was made of balloons in the 18th and 19th Century. The first instance was by the French Aerostatic Corps in 1794, who used a tethered balloon to gain a vantage point. Later, balloons were allowed to drift over enemy defences for observation purposes. However, balloons could often be driven off by smoke and so military aviation did not play a significant part in warfare until World War I.

Before World War I

The armies of many countries evaluated the use of aircraft for observation purposes. Naval aviation was pursued as well; several tests were made in which floatplanes were launched by catapult from ships at sea, and recovered later by crane.

The U.S. Navy had been interested in naval aviation since the turn of the 20th century. In 1910-1911, the Navy conducted experiments which proved the practicality of carrier-based aviation. On November 14, 1910, near Hampton Roads, Virginia, civilian pilot Eugene Ely took off from a wooden platform installed on the scout cruiser USS Birmingham (CL-2). He landed safely on shore a few minutes later. Ely proved several months later that it was also possible to land on a ship. On January 18, 1911, he landed on a platform attached to the American cruiser USS Pennsylvania (ACR-4) in San Francisco harbour.

The first use of aeroplanes in an actual war was in the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-12, when the Italians carried out a few reconnaissance and bombing missions.

World War I

Initially during that war both sides made use of tethered balloons and airplanes for observation purposes, both for information gathering and directing of artillery fire. A desire to prevent enemy observation led to airplane pilots attacking other airplanes and balloons, initially with small arms carried in the cockpit, and later with machine guns mounted on the aircraft. Both sides also made use of aircraft for bombing, strafing and dropping of propaganda. The German military made use of Zeppelins to drop bombs on Britain.

By the end of the war airplanes had become specialised into bombers, fighters and observation aircraft.

Between the wars

Between 1918 and 1939 aircraft technology developed very rapidly. In 1918 most aircraft were biplanes with wooden frames, canvas skins, wire rigging and air-cooled engines. Biplanes continued to be the mainstay of air forces around the world and were used extensively in conflicts such as the Spanish Civil War. Most industrial countries also created air forces separate from the army and navy. However, by 1939 military biplanes were in the process of being replaced with metal framed monoplanes, often with stressed skins and liquid cooled engines. Top speeds had tripled; altitudes doubled (and oxygen masks become commonplace); ranges and payloads of bombers increased enormously.

Some theorists, especially in Britain, considered that aircraft would become the dominant military arm in the future. They imagined that a future war would be won entirely by the destruction of the enemy's military and industrial capability from the air.

Others, such as General Billy Mitchell in the United States, saw the potential of air power to neutralize the striking power of naval surface fleets. German and British pilots had experimented with aerial bombing of ships and air-dropped torpedoes during World War I with mixed results. But the vulnerability of capital ships to aircraft was finally demonstrated on 21 July 1921 when a squadron of bombers commanded by General Mitchell sank the ex-German battleship SMS Ostfriesland with aerial bombs.

Germany was banned from possessing a significant air force by the terms of the WWI armistice. The German military continued to train its soldiers as pilots clandestinely until Hitler was ready to openly defy the ban.

World War II

Military aviation came into its own during the Second World War. The increased performance, range, and payload of contemporary aircraft meant that air power could move beyond the novelty applications of World War I, becoming a central striking force for all the combatant nations.

Over the course of the war, several distinct roles emerged for the application of air power.

Strategic bombing

Strategic bombing of civilian targets from the air was a strategy first proposed by the Italian theorist General Giulio Douhet. In his book The Command of the Air (1921), Douhet argued that future military leaders could avoid falling into bloody World War I-style trench stalemates by using aviation to strike past the enemy's forces directly at their vulnerable civilian population. Douhet believed that such strikes would cause these populations to rise up in revolt and overthrow their governments to stop the bombing.

Douhet's ideas were paralleled by other military theorists who emerged from World War I, including Sir Hugh Trenchard in Britain. In the interwar period, Britain and the United States became the most enthusiastic supporters of the strategic bombing theory, with each nation building specialized heavy bombers specifically for this task.

Luftwaffe<h4> In the early days of WW II both sides avoided strikes against enemy cities, fearing retaliation. When the Luftwaffe, frustrated in its attempts to gain command of the air over Britain in preparation for the planned invasion, turned to the bombing of London and other large cities, they found that it did not have the effect that was predicted by prewar airpower theorists. <h4>Royal Air Force<h4> The British, believing that the German civilian morale was easier to break, started a stategic bombing campaign in 1940 that was to last for the rest of the war. The British bombers of the early war were all twin engined designs and were lacking in defensive armament. Therefore they were quickly forced to adopt a policy of night bombing, which meant that they were never able to hit specific targets such as factories or power plants. <h4>U.S. Army Air Force<h4> When the American 8th Army Air Force arrived in England in 1942, the Americans were convinced that they could do what the RAF and the Luftwaffe could not. The 8th was equipped with B-17 Flying Fortresses and B-24 Liberators, both high-altitude four-engined designs with turbo-superchargers. The new bombers also featured the strongest defensive armament yet seen - up to 12 .50 caliber machine guns, depending on the version, most of them in power-operated turrets. Flying during daylight in large, close formations, they were supposed to gain command of the air by themselves. The intended raids would hit hard on chokepoints in the German war economy such as oil refineries or ball bearing factories. The Americans learned the hard way that bombers alone, no matter how heavily armed, could not win the war in the air. Loss rates were rising as they forced their way deeper into enemy territory in 1943, when the infamous strike against the ball bearing plant in Regensburg, Bavaria took place. <h4>Air superiority<h4> During the Battle of Britain many of the Luftwaffe's best pilots had been forced to bail out over British soil, where they were captured. As the quality of the Luftwaffe fighter arm decreased, the Americans introduced the long-ranged P-38 Lightning and P-51 Mustang escort fighters, carrying drop tanks. Newer, inexperienced German pilots—flying potentially superior aircraft like the Focke-Wulf Fw 190 and the Messerschmitt Me 262—gradually became less and less effective at thinning the late-war American bomber streams. Adding fighters to the daylight raids gave the bombers much-needed protection and greatly improved the impact of the strategic bombing effort. <h4>Effectiveness<h4> Strategic bombing did not win the war for the Allies, but in the words of the German armaments minister Albert Speer it created "a second front in the air" long before D-day created the second front on the ground. Speer succeded in increasing the output of armaments right up to mid-1944 in spite of the bombing. Still, the war against the British and American bombers demanded enormous amounts of resources: antiaircraft guns, day and night fighters, radars, searchlights, manpower, ammo and fuel. As a result, the German army groups in Russia, Italy and France rarely saw friendly aircraft and constantly ran short of tanks, trucks, and anti-tank weapons. The only option left was to create World War I-style slit trench defenses quite unlike the Blitzkriegs of 1939-1941.

Tactical air support

By contrast with the British strategists, the primary purpose of the German Luftwaffe was to support the ground army. This accounted for the presence of large numbers of dive bombers in the make-up, and the scarcity of long-range heavy bombers. This 'flying artillery' greatly assisted in the successes of the German Army in the Battle of France (1940). Hitler determined that air superiority was a requirement for the invasion of Britain. When this was not achieved in the Battle of Britain during the summer of 1940 the invasion was cancelled, making this the first major battle whose outcome was determined primarily in the air.

Naval aviation

Aircraft and the aircraft carrier first became important in naval battles in World War II, particularly at the:

Post World War II

Military aviation in the post-war years was dominated by the needs of the Cold War. The post-war years saw the almost total conversion of combat aircraft to jet power, which resulted in enormous increases in speeds and altitudes of aircraft. Until the advent of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile major powers relied on high-altitude bombers to deliver their newly-developed nuclear deterrent; each country strove to develop the technology of bombers and the high-altitude fighters that could intercept them. The concept of air superiority began to play a heavy role in aircraft designs for both the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Americans developed and made extensive use of the high-altitude observation aircraft for intelligence-gathering. The U-2, and later the SR-71 Blackbird were developed in great secrecy. The U-2 at its time was supposed to be invulnerable to defensive measures, due to its extreme altitude. It therefore came as a great shock when the Soviets downed one piloted by Gary Powers with a ground-to-air missile.

In the 70s and 80s it became clear that speed and altitude was not enough to protect a bomber against air defences. The emphasis shifted therefore to maneuverable attack aircraft that could fly 'under the radar', at altitudes of a few hundred feet.

The development of the helicopter revolutionised the aerial support of ground forces. A helicopter could deliver troops quickly to areas inaccessible to fixed-wing aircraft - and, unlike paratroops, they could be recovered again. This led to an entirely new class of airmobile troops, reffered to as "[Air Cavalry]" in the U.S., able to land unexpectedly, strike, and leave again. Such tactics played a major part in the Vietnam War.

Post Cold War

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 forced Western air forces to undergo a shift from the massive numbers felt to be necessary during the Cold War to smaller numbers of multi-role aircraft. The closure of several military bases overseas and the U.S. Base Realignment and Closure program have served to highlight the effectiveness of aircraft carriers in the absence of dedicated military or air forces bases, as the Falklands war and U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf have highlighted. While the advent of precision-guided munitions have allowed for strikes at arbitrary surface targets once proper reconnaissance is performed, the standard military doctrine still applies: wars against third-world regional entities still cannot be won through air power alone.

See also


External links

de:Luftkrieg sv:Kriget i luften

pt:Guerra aérea