Iran Air Flight 655

Categories: Airliner shootdowns | Non-combat accidents involving military | 1988 | History of Iran

Image:IranAir300.jpg
The USS Vincennes shot down an Iran Air passenger aircraft similar to this Iran Air Airbus, killing all 290 passengers and crew on board.

Iran Air Flight 655 (IR655) was a commercial flight operated by Iran Air, that flew on a Tehran-Bandar Abbas-Dubai route. On July 3, 1988, the flight was shot down by USS Vincennes on the Bandar Abbas-Dubai leg, which resulted in 290 civilian fatalities from six nations including 66 children. There were 38 non-Iranians aboard.

The first leg of the flight went as planned, and the plane, an Airbus A300B2, registered EP-IBU, left Bandar Abbas at 10:17am that day, 27 minutes after its scheduled departure time of 09:50am. It would have been a 28-minute flight. At that same time, the U.S. Navy guided missile cruiser, USS Vincennes, fitted with the AEGIS combat system, was nearby in the Strait of Hormuz, which the commercial airliner, flown by captain Mohsen Rezaian, would pass over. In command of Vincennes was Commander William C. Rogers III. At the time of the incident, Vincennes, in support of Operation Earnest Will, was within Iranian territorial waters, following combat with and pursuit of Iranian gunboats. The USS Sides (FFG-14) and the USS Elmer Montgomery (FF-1082) were nearby.

What happened thereafter is still subject to debate.

Contents

[edit]

U.S. government sources

According to U.S. government accounts, Vincennes mistakenly identified the Iranian airplane as an attacking military fighter. The officers identified the flight profile being flown by the A300B2 as being similar to that of an Iranian Air Force F-14A Tomcat during an attack run. According to the same reports Vincennes tried more than once to contact Flight 655, but there was no acknowledgement. The official ICAO report stated that these attempts to contact Iran Air 655 were sent on the wrong frequency and addressed to a non-existent "Iranian F-14". At 10:24am, with the civilian jet 11 nautical miles away, Vincennes fired a volley of two SM-2ER antiaircraft missiles. The first missile broke the aircraft in two and damaged the tailplane and right wing. After the engagement Vincennes' crew realised that the plane had been a civilian airliner.

This version was finalised in a report [1] by Admiral William Fogarty, entitled Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988. This report is so far only partially released (part I in 1988, part II in 1993), a fact criticised by many observers.

"The disaster of the USS Vincennes shooting down an Iranian passenger airliner in the Gulf War could be partially ascribed to the Aegis system introducing an expectancy bias and not assisting users to correct the impression formed. The design as well as the unhelpful user interface of the Aegis system contributed to errors of judgement." (Turpin and du Plooy 2004: 785) [2] (PDF)

[edit]

Independent sources

Independent investigations into the events have presented a different picture. John Barry and Roger Charles, of Newsweek, wrote that Commander Rogers acted recklessly and without due care. Their report further accused the U.S. government of a cover-up.[3] An analysis[4] of the events by the International Strategic Studies Association described the deployment of an Aegis cruiser in the zone as irresponsible and felt that the expense of the ship had played a major part in the setting of a low threshold for opening fire. On November 6 2003 the International Court of Justice concluded that the U.S. Navy's actions in the Persian Gulf at the time had been unlawful.

Three years after the incident, Admiral William Crowe admitted on Nightline that the Vincennes was inside Iranian territorial waters at the time of the shoot-down. This directly contradicted the official Navy claims of the previous years.

Captain David Carlson, commander of the USS Sides, the warship stationed nearby the Vincennes at the time of the incident, is reported (Fisk, 2005) to have said that the destruction of the aircraft "marked the horrifying climax to Captain Rogers' aggressiveness, first seen four weeks ago" - that referring to incidents on the 2nd June when Rogers' had sailed the Vincennes too close to an Itranian frigate undertaking a lawful search of a bulk carrier, launched a helicoptor within 2-3 miles of an Iranian small craft despite rules of engagement requiring a 4 mile seperation, and opened fire on a number of small Iranian military boats. Of those incidents, Carlson commented "Why do you want an Aegis cruiser out there shooting up boats? It wasn't a smart thing to do". At the time of Rogers' announcement to higher command that he was going to shoot down the plane, Carlson is reported (Fisk, 2005) to have been thunderstruck: "I said to folks around me, 'why, what the hell is he doing?' I went through the drill again. F-14. He's climbing. By now this damn thing is at 7,000 feet". However Carlson thought the Vincennes might have more information, and was unaware that Rogers had been wrongly informed that the plane was diving.

[edit]

Radio frequencies

Throughout its final flight IR655 was in radio contact with various air traffic control services using standard civil aviation frequencies, and had spoken in English to Bandar Abbas Approach Control seconds before Vincennes launched its missiles. Vincennes at that time had no equipment suitable for monitoring civil aviation frequencies, other than the International Air Distress frequency, despite being a sophisticated anti-aircraft warship. Subsequently U.S. Navy warships in the area were equipped with dialable VHF radios, and access to flight plan information was sought, to better track commercial airliners.

[edit]

Contributing factors

  • The flight left Bandar Abbas airport 27 minutes late.
  • An Iranian P-3 was in the area, providing a potential explanation for the lack of target acquisition radar interrogation
  • Flight 655 deviated from the centre of its air corridor, an unusual occurrence with commercial flights (it was 3.35 NM off of the 10 NM wide corridor at the time of shoot-down); unfortunately, that deviation had it bearing straight at the Vincennes.
  • A Mode II IFF squawk was mistakenly attributed to the Airbus track, identifying it as an Iranian military aircraft (commercial aircraft respond with Mode III squawks). Further, Iranian pilots had used fake mode III squawks in the recent past. The mistaken mode II squawk occurred because the Vincennes' IFF interrogator had been kept focussed at the end of the Bandar Abbas runway rather than Flight 655's actual position, and an Iranian military aircraft did happen to take off during the seven minutes of the incident's prosecution. There were F-14s stationed at the airport.
  • The crew of the Vincennes' Combat Information Center (CIC) confusingly reported the plane as ascending and descending at the same time (there were two "camps"). This seems to have happened because the Airbus' original CIC track, number 4474, had been replaced by the Sides' track, number 4131, when the computer recognised them as one and the same. Shortly thereafter, track 4474 was re-assigned by the system to an American A-6, several hundred miles away, which was following a descending course at the time. Apparently not all the crew in the CIC realised the track number had been switched on them.
  • It is likely the crew of the Airbus were listening to Bandar Abbas on one ear and Dubai on the other, because this was a short flight. This may explain why they ignored the Vincennes' repeated hailings (which were directed at an « unknown Iranian F-14 » in any case).
[edit]

Medals awarded

While issuing notes of regret over the loss of human life, the U.S. government has, to date, neither admitted any wrongdoing or responsibility in this tragedy, nor apologized, but continues to blame Iranian hostile actions for the incident. The men of the Vincennes were all awarded combat-action ribbons. Commander Lustig, the air-warfare coordinator, even won the navy's Commendation Medal for "heroic achievement", his "ability to maintain his poise and confidence under fire" having enabled him to "quickly and precisely complete the firing procedure."[5] According to a 23 April 1990 article printed in The Washington Post, the Legion of Merit was presented to Captain Rogers and Lieutenant Commander Lustig on 3 July 1988. The citations did not mention the downing of the Iran Air flight at all.

The incident continued to overshadow U.S.-Iran relations for many years. Following the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 six months later, the British and American governments initially blamed the PFLP-GC, a Palestinian militant group backed by Syria, with assumptions of assistance from Iran in retaliation for Iran Air Flight 655. [6] The blame was later shifted to Libya.

The Flight 655 incident has often been compared to that of Korean Air Flight 007 interception by the Soviet Air Force in 1983.

Vice President George H. W. Bush declared a month later, "I will never apologize for the United States of America, ever. I don't care what the facts are."

[edit]

Compensation

On February 22, 1996 the United States agreed to pay Iran US$61.8 million in compensation ($300,000 per wage-earning victim, $150,000 per non-wage-earner) for the 248 Iranians killed in the shootdown. This was an agreed settlement to discontinue a case brought by Iran in 1989 against the U.S. in the International Court of Justice [7]. The payment of compensation was explicitly characterized as being on an ex gratia basis, and the U.S. denied having any responsibility or liability for the incident.

[edit]

See also

[edit]

External links

[edit]

References

  1. The Great War for Civilisation - The Conquest of the Middle East". Robert Fisk, Fourth Estate, October 2005 pp318-328. ISBN 184115007Xpt:Vôo 655 da Iran Air